In the academic year 1968-9, the University of Paris II hosted Wolfgang Friedmann, on sabbatical from Columbia University, as Associate Professor. A number of young French students thus had the opportunity to follow a seminar in international economic law which was to influence deeply the careers of several of them, among them myself. Quite apart from the topic dealt with -international economic law was not yet commonly taught in French universities -it was Friedmann's personality as such that exercised undeniable charm. His Mozartian first name expressed his character, but only in part Indeed, Friedmann had two forenames, which clashed rather brusquely to our Parisian student ears: alongside Wolfgang was Gaston, the first pointing to his German father, and the second to his French mother.
It was from a feeling that this international legal culture had become less 'plural', less diversified, less truly 'international' than in Friedmann's time that the idea arose to invite a group of 'trans-Atlantic' authors to participate in a Symposium on the current state of international law, with tbe aim of strengthening the still too loose links between people and schools of thought on both sides of the ocean.
Hence the idea of setting out from a reconsideration of tbe themes of Friedmann's undoubtedly best-known work, The Changing Structure of International Law. We felt this book typified one current of thought in international law (which might be called a current of institutionalist thought) that marked the 1960s. Other names one might mention in this connection are Jessup, Jenks, and certainly Lauterpacht, on the side of English-language scholarship, and on the French side authors influenced by Scelle, including R.-J. Dupuy, Colliaid or, equally, Virally.
4 It would undoubtedly be easy to find representatives of this school in other European countries.
Four themes were selected for discussion in this Symposium. For each of these, two authors, one on either side of the Atlantic, were asked to contribute papers. A third writer was invited to comment on the two texts. This issue of the Journal features the contributions on the first theme: Tbe State between Fragmentation and Globalization. Articles on tbe other three themes will be presented in forthcoming issues.
In this introduction, we shall briefly review some of the most typical themes developed by Friedmann in his work, as being representative of the 1960s scholarship that was to influence many authors of the next generation, namely our own. Looking backward will provide a starting point for the forward-looking considerations of the authors contributing to this Symposium. In the last analysis, if the course of history has not exactly followed Friedmann's expectations, the contradiction be noted between national fervour and international, transnational and even supranational realities certainly exists and has deepened still further. This topic will be explored by the authors in these pages. Their task is to examine the present situation of the state, caught as it is between mounting internal divisions and the globalization of economic and technical phenomena which have experienced unceasing growth since the time that Friedmann wrote his major work. The Changing Structure, 35-37, at 3d
IL The Hierarchy of Norms
One may search in vain in the 410 pages of The Changing Structure of International Law for the least allusion to the question of a hierarchy of norms in international law, to which so many books and articles have since been devoted: jus cogens, obligations erga omnes, the distinction between crimes and delicts in international law were all issues that appeared after Friedmann had spent his life thinking about international law. Is this very absence not, though, confirmation of Friedmann's main intuition, which dominates his entire approach to international law? For by placing the changing structure of international law at the centre of his thoughts, he could only mean that international law has a basically evolutionary, rather than fixed, structure. Indeed, the best proof of this evolutionary nature is surely to be found in the emergence, only a few years after Friedmann's work was published, of this set of problems he knew not of, so close then and yet so distant already, which relate to the possible (or impossible) existence of a hierarchy of norms in international law.
But for us today, 'revisiting' the panorama Friedmann left us, we must obviously take these new developments into account This is surely an additional manifestation of our fidelity to the spirit that animated Friedmann when he wrote The Changing Structure. Thus, the second theme to be explored in this Symposium is whether a hierarchy of norms does indeed exist in international law.
HL The New Subjects of International Law
Another theme one might identify in Friedmann's work, again to be found frequently among the 1960s authors mentioned earlier, is that of the 'new subjects' of international law, dealt with by Friedmann in Chapters 13-15 of The Changing Structure. These are, first of all, certainly the international organizations, the consecration of which as such, in the International Court of Justice's opinion of 11 April 1949 on Reparation for Damages Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, was still very recent at the time Friedmann was writing.
But there is also, and this is a point which traditionally encounters innumerable objections, the possibility for physical or legal persons also to be, to a limited extent, subjects of international law. It is interesting to note that Friedmann deals with this point by very clearly distinguishing the position of companies vis-a-vis international law from that of physical persons, i.e. individuals.
A. Companies
Friedmann, in fact, treats the whole issue of multinational enterprises (or transnational companies) with a considerable degree of clairvoyance, even though he never uses these terms, which had not yet appeared in the international legal 14 This adumbrates a discussion that was to rage in subsequent years on the internationalization of certain types of contracts concluded by states.
13
He notes in this connection the growth in the number of arbitrations between states and private companies in the area of international investments (especially in connection with concession agreements) and argues that the time is ripe for the realization of certain projects aimed at creating a permanent mechanism for settling disputes on these questions. This type of mechanism would enable companies to bring an action directly against a state before an international court, without having to have recourse to the diplomatic protection of their national state. 16 Indeed, not much later, in March 1965, the Washington Convention was signed, setting up the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. We are all familiar with the role it was to play.
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One might add that he devotes an entire chapter (Chapter 12) to the general principles of law, to which, following Lauterpacht, he accords an important function in the development of international law. And while he recognizes that the International Court of Justice is reluctant to have recourse to these principles for fear 12 Ibid, ch. 14. and of Lauterpacht 21 maintained that an evolution of international law was under way; an evolution he sincerely desired, while remaining acutely aware that the essentially intergovernmental structure of this law necessarily brings the deepest resistance to such breakthroughs in the international legal order by the individual.
It should be noted first of all that be tackles the problem starting from the international criminal responsibility of the individual, strikingly confirmed by the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals. This responsibility requires the prosecution of war criminals and those guilty of crimes against humanity and peace. This responsibility is for Friedmann the first expression of the constitution of an international status of the individual: for if the individual can be directly prosecuted for infringements of international law, then the individual ought also to be able directly to benefit, he argues, from rights conferred by international law. Although there has been no organic connection between the movement for an international recognition of human rights, mainly through the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and the subsequent draft covenants of the United Nations, and the imposition of individual criminal responsibility on prominent individuals of the German and Japanese nationalities, in the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials of war criminals, there should be a general correlation between rights and duties. To the extent that the individual is held entitled to assert certain claims to human dignity and the protection of vital human interests on an international level, he can also be furry held to assume a coiiesponding degree of roponribiKty for actions that directly interfere with such values.
ChariesLeben
Friedmann dwells much on this development of an international penal law, the first manifestations of which appeared with the incrimination of piracy as a crime jure gentium, then of the slave trade, white slave traffic, drug trafficking, and so forth. 23 However, it was the establishment of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals that he repeatedly returned to in his work, as constituting for him the most important milestone in the evolution of international law. He argues that the principle that, in certain exceptional circumstances, the individual may be held responsible for certain actions committed against aliens or even against his own nationals, is an important affirmation of the fact that it is ultimately individuals who compose mankind, and that the philosophy of international law is beginning to move away from the poisonous Hegelian and neo-Hegelian doctrines which postulate the state as the total integration of tbc individual and the necessary repository of both his freedom and his responsibility. Ultimately, for Friedmann the real rift is to be found in the international law of cooperation: the gap between developed and developing countries, between marketeconomy and state-trading countries. It is here that the heterogeneity of interests, values and philosophies is strongest, contributing to the division of mankind Friedmann naturally raises the question of the rules of international law on nationalization through tbe claim for permanent sovereignty of states over their natural resources, or the question of the rules of economic liberalism on which the international institutions set up after the Second World War, such as the IMF or GATT, were based. 31 It should be noted that 1964, the year that Friedmann's work was published, was also the year of the creation of UNCTAD, which was set up with the aim of promoting a different economic logic.
But how do things stand today, at a time when the ideological division between capitalist and communist countries -which for Friedmann was one of the essential faultlines in international society -has practically disappeared, when the ground rules of international liberalism are now adopted by all, including China (one wonders whether it ought still to be called communist), and when the unity of the grouping of developing countries has disintegrated? At tbe same time, the division between the developed countries and tbe so-called developing countries, many of which are instead beading for even greater underdevelopment, is stronger than ever. These themes will be taken up in tbe fourth part of this Symposium, devoted to the international community.
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The Changing Structure, ch. 21, at 341-361.
